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Abstract. Power grids are generally regarded as very reliable systems, nevertheless outages
and electricity shortfalls are common events and have the potential to produce significant social
and economic consequences. It is important to reduce the likelihood of those severe accidents
by assuring safe operations and robust topologies. The grid safety relies on accurate vulnera-
bility measures, control schemes and good quality information. For instance, in power network
operations, contingency analysis is used to constrain the network to secure operative states with
respect to predefined failures (e.g. list of single component failures). An exhaustive failure list is
often not treatable, therefore a selection or ranking is performed to help in the choice. In order
to better understand the power network weakness and strengths a variety of robustness metrics
have been introduced in literature, although many do not account or partially account for un-
certainties which might affect the analysis. In this work power network vulnerability to failure
events is analysed and single line outages (N-1 contingencies) have been ranked using different
metrics (i.e. topology-based, flow-based and hybrid metrics). Sources of uncertainty such as
power demand variability and lack of precise knowledge on the network parameters have been
accounted for and its effect on the component ranking quantified. A modified version of the
IEEE 118 bus power network has been selected as representative case study. The assumption
underpinning the methodologies and the vulnerability results also accounting uncertainty are
discussed.
6121
Roberto Rocchetta,Edoardo Patelli
1 INTRODUCTION
Robustness of power grids is defined as the degree to witch the network is able to withstand
an unexpected event without degradation in performance [1]. A closely related concept is the
vulnerability, which is sometime regarded as lack of robustness. Robustness and vulnerability
are nowadays major concerns for the future power networks. Historically, power networks were
developed to distribute electricity from large size isolated power plants to the various end-user
loads (e.g. industry or residences) by means of power transmission and distribution networks.
Distribution grids topologies were usually designed in radial fashion to comply with the needs
of a simple one-way flow of electricity, i.e. from the main grid to the local users.
In the last decades this traditional design has deeply changed, the allocation of renewable
energy sources are making its behaviour less predictable and vulnerability assessments less
reliable, mainly due to the considerable amount of uncertainty injected in the system [2]. Non-
radial meshed topologies and not classical structures are likely to became more common in
the future [3]. The presented scenario highlights the need of develop more reliable and robust
frameworks for power grid vulnerability analysis (i.e. adopting sophisticated uncertainty quan-
tification techniques), as well as the need of define enhanced metric for the assessment and
identification of operational and structural risks. In order to improve robustness it is important
to understand the role played by the variability the grid state variables (e.g. power produced,
loads, voltage phases, magnitudes.) and by the imprecisely known network parameters (flow
and voltage limits, topology, line resistances, etc.). Structural weaknesses have to be identified
to design better topologies (e.g. by efficient ranking of components failures) and mitigate like-
lihood of unexpected hazardous situations .
In literature, a wide range of indexes have been proposed for vulnerability and robustness as-
sessment, e.g. using realistic simulation of network response and power-flow solution (“power-
flow-based metrics”) or based on topological analysis of networks, using techniques founded
on complex network theory [4]. The latter are computed using pure topological approaches (i.e.
‘topology-based metrics’) or enhanced by including electrical engineering concepts in the anal-
ysis (i.e. ‘hybrid metrics’). Examples of recently applied metrics are the effective resistance
(RG), network spectral radius (ρG), algebraic connectivity (ΛG) and extended betweenness (Be)
M. Ouyang et al. [6] analysed correlation of six topology-based vulnerability metrics respect to
multiple components failure. E. Bompard et al. [5] compared two hybrid metrics (i.e. extended
betweenness and net-ability) in their ability to rank components failures. Power-flow-based
metric, such as system cascading index (CEI), has been applied to estimate likelihood and ex-
tent of cascading failures [7].
To the Authors knowledge, few among the reviewed works quantified the effect of uncer-
tainty in the metrics and compared the different ranks of component failures. Hence, further
comparison between different indices, with particular regard to the uncertainties affecting the
different approaches seems to be needed. In this survey vulnerability metrics are compared, with
particular regard to the line failures ranking. Power demand uncertainty and system parame-
ters (line power flow limits) uncertainty are analysed and their effect quantified. In addition,
different power-flow models (i.e. alternate current and direct current power-flows) have been
compared in the results. The work aim is to better understand strength and limitations of the
different metrics in ranking critical components and spot network weaknesses, also accounting
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uncertainty.
The paper is structured as follows:
Power network modelling is introduced in Section 2. Contingency analysis and uncertainty
modelling are described in in Section 3. In Section 4 robustness and vulnerability concepts are
discussed and the metrics defined. A case study is defined in Section 5 and results displayed.
Limitation faced and further discussions are presented in Section 6. Section 7 close the paper.
2 BACKGROUND AND POWER NETWORK MODELLING
A power network structure can be represented by an unweighed graph G = {N ,L}, where
N is the set of network nodes (or busses) and L is the set of links (branches or feeders). The
topology of the graph is identified by a squared symmetric matrix called adjacency matrix A,
which elements ai,j are equal 1 if the node i is linked to the node j or 0 if no direct link ex-
ists. Links can be associated to some measure of interest (e.g. length, traffic, power flow, line
resistance, etc.) and the adjacency matrix rewritten in its weighted form W , where the matrix
elements wi,j are the weights of the links between nodes i and j and 0 if not linked.
Spectral graph theory can be used analyse spectral graph proprieties of networks such as
its eigenvalues eigenvectors. Spectral proprieties of graph G bears valuable information about
the network the graph represent and some eigenvalues can be associated to its robustness [8].
Further details are going to be discussed in Section 4.
The Laplacian LA of the adjacency matrix A is defined as [9]:
LA = DA − A (1)
where A is the adjacency matrix and DA is the diagonal matrix of degrees for A. The matrix
Laplacian can be computed using the weighed adjacency matrix W (i.e. including electrical
concepts such as susceptances).
AC and DC Power Flow
Power flow methods are commonly used to solve problem in power grid analysis, as example
the energy dispatch problem, i.e. optimal schedule of power production, or security constrained
optimal power scheduling. The AC power flow is a non linear solver accounting both active and
reactive power flows without neglecting loses. In the AC formulation the active and reactive
nodal equations are as follow [10]:
Pk =
N∑
i
|Vi||Vk|[Gi,kcos(θi,k) +Bi,ksin(θi,k)] (2)
Qk =
N∑
i
|Vi||Vk|[Gi,ksin(θi,k)−Bi,kcos(θi,k)] (3)
where Pk and Qk are active and reactive power injected in the node k, respectively, |Vi| is the
voltage magnitude of node i and θi,j is the voltage angle difference between node i and k. The
elements Gi,k and Bi,k are the conductance and susceptance of the link connecting node i and
k, respectively.The Equations 2-3 are solved for each k ∈ N by some iterative techniques (e.g.
Newton-Raphson method) although convergence is not always assured.
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The DC power flow is a linear approximation of the AC power flow which account for just
active power flows, neglecting power loses and reactive power management. It has been widely
used to alleviate the computational cost of numerically intensive codes and it has always a fea-
sible solution. The majority of works which aimed at including electrical engineering concepts
in graph theoretical approaches made use of the DC assumption, e.g. in defining weighted
adjacency matrix of the graph. The DC power flow formulation can be written as follows [10]:
Pk =
N∑
i
|Vi||Vk|Bi,ksin(θi,k) ≈
N∑
i
Bi,kθi,k (4)
were the equation 4 is obtained under the following DC power flow assumptions:
• Flat voltage profile |Vi| = 1 per unit. ∀ i ∈ N
• Small voltage angle differencessin(θi,k) ≈ θi,k;
• R X negligible resistance;
It is worth remarking that DC model although useful in reducing computational time, might
result in a poor approximation [10]. In order to obtain good quality results, grid voltage profile
should be as flat as possible and ratio X/R relatively high. This means that the quality of the
DC solution is system dependent and operative state dependent, hence its validity should be
carefully assessed before use. The vast majority of topology-based metrics when enhanced by
using electrical concepts made use of the DC assumptions [4].
3 TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTY
Generally speaking, uncertainty can be separated in two groups, the so called aleatory and
epistemic uncertainties [11]. The aleatory is related to stochastic behaviours and randomness
in events and variables. The epistemic is commonly related to lack of knowledge about a par-
ticular behaviour, imprecision in measurement and poorly designed models. Adequately model
uncertainty is paramount to improve robustness of the analysis accounting for both lack of infor-
mation and inherent randomness (e.g. environmental conditions, future power demand, power
produced by renewable generators, etc.). In the power grid context well-recognized sources
of uncertainty are electricity price volatility, load power demand and environmental variabil-
ity, model assumption (e.g. DC or AC power flow, contingency selection). The sources of
uncertainty investigated in this work are:
• Uncertainty in the line emergency rating (line power flow constrain) which might be due
to, e.g. neglected effect of ambient wind and temperature. The lack of precise knowledge
on the emergency ratings of network lines have been modelled using uniform distributions
around a given design value [12]. The uniform distribution has been used consistently
with the principle of maximum entropy.
• Load demand uncertainty and variability. The aggregated load connected to a node i
(PL,i) can be described by a Normal distribution [13].The parameter of the distribution
can be estimated from historical records of load demand per node.
A Monte Carlo sampling procedure have been used to propagate uncertainty from the input
to the output quantities of interest. Within each Monte Carlo run, sampling procedure (e.g. in-
verse transform sampling) is used to obtain a random realization for each uncertain parameter
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(nodal loads and line loading limits). The samples are forwarded to the system for further vul-
nerability assessment and contingency ranking. The algorithm allows obtaining a probabilistic
description of the outputs variability, i.e. the output probability distribution functions with re-
spect to the input uncertainties and wider prospective on the result of the ranking.
A contingency in power networks is defined as the unexpected failure of one of its compo-
nents (e.g. links, nodes, generators, transformers) [13]. Contingency analysis is commonly used
to constrain the network to safe operational states if a contingency occurs. Generally speaking,
even if the network has modest size (e.g. small distribution grid), a complete analysis of all pos-
sible failures is infeasible. An exhaustive contingency list will has to include
N∑
k=1
N !/k!(N−k)!
failures, where k is the number of failed components. In power grid reliability and risk assess-
ment, common practice consists in selecting a subset of the more threatening contingencies
based on expert opinion or by some identification procedure [15]. In this work, the N−1 single
line trips are analysed and the most threatening failures ranked using different metrics.
4 ROBUSTNESS AND VULNERABILITY METRICS
Robustness in power grid is defined as the degree to witch the network is able to withstand
an unexpected event without degradation in performance [6]. Vulnerability is used to score low
reliability power grids by assessing drops in performance metrics. The network vulnerability
V(Ci) after the contingency (Ci) occurs can be quantified as follows [4]:
V(Ci) = M−M(Ci)M (5)
where M(Ci) is the network vulnerability metric after contingency Ci and M is the metric
value for the undamaged network.
Power flow-based metrics
Flow-based indexes can be obtained by simulating network in normal and damaged states
and using power flow solvers (e.g. DC or AC). In this work a cascading metric (CEI(Ci))
is obtained simulating the outages by both AC power flow contingency analysis and its linear
DC approximation. Generally speaking, a “cascading” is a sequential successions of depen-
dent events [18].The metric adopted to assess the cascading overload vulnerability is defined as
follows [18]:
CEI(Ci) =
∑
l∈L
P(Cl|Ci)SevOLl(Ci) (6)
where P(Cl|Ci) is the probability of secondary trip of line l after line i contingency occurs
and SevOLl(Ci) is the severity function for line l overload if failure Ci occurs. Severity func-
tions are used to quantify the extent of the failure and different definitions are available [13].
The continuous severity function for overload is specifically defined for each link l (distribution
lines and transformers) and it measures the extent of violation in terms of excessive power flow
ratio PRl. PRl is the ratio between active power flowing in the line Pl and its emergency rating
Pemerg,l. The expression for the continuous severity due to overload (SevOLl) of a line l is
findable in [13].
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SevOLl = d ∗ PRl + c for PRl ≥ PRminl (7)
where SevOLl is zero for values of the flow rating less than a safety limit PRminl =0.9. The
deterministic limit for the violation of line l is PRl=1, the near violation region is 0.9≤ PRl <1,
and the value PRl under 0.9 is regarded as safe, d=10 and c=-9.
Continuous severity functions, if compared with discrete severity functions, have the advan-
tage of providing non zero risk results for scenarios close to the performance limits, but not
failure, which reflects the realistic sense that near violation scenarios have not null risk. The
probability of cascading trip of line k after an initiating contingency i can be expressed as in
[7]:
P(Cj|Ci) = Pj(Ci, ζ)− P0,j(ζ)
Ptrip,j(Ci, ζ)− P0,j(ζ)
(8)
where Pj(Ci, ζ) is the post-contingency flow on circuit j given contingency i and operative-
environmental condition ζ , Ptrip,j(Ci, ζ) is defined as the flow leading to a certain trip of the
line j (assumed to be 125% of its maximum capacity) and P0,j(ζ) is the pre-contingency flow
in the line j if condition ζ holds. Equation 8 is related to the fact that higher load levels and
larger transients increases the likelihood of cascading event on circuit k after initiating event on
circuit i. The probability P(Cj|Ci) is zero for Pj(Ci, ζ) ≥ 0.9Pemerg,j .
Topology-based and hybrid metrics
Power network vulnerability can by pure topological analysis of the grid structure. These ap-
proach use unweighted adjacency matrix A, components are regarded as identical and no rough
electrical concept is included in the analysis [4]. Similarly, hybrid metrics adopt complex net-
work concepts often include concepts such as DC approximation and electrical concepts such
as line emergency rating Pemerg,l or link impedances. For these approaches the weighted ad-
jacency matrix W is built using the matrix of susceptances Bi,k. The analysed metrics in this
paper are: graph spectral radius, algebraic connectivity, effective graph resistance, graph global
efficiency [22] and extended betweenness [5].
In spectral analysis of graphs, the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix is known as
graph spectral radius (ρG). Few works attempted to relate spectral radius to the power grid vul-
nerability and relatively small values have been considered as indicator of robustness [8]. An-
other important metrics obtained through spectral analysis of the network graph is the second
smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix L, also known as the algebraic connectivity (ΛG).
The metric ΛG is used as indicator of the level of connection between nodes in a graph,and is re-
garded as a basic indication of the network robustness level [16]. The effective graph resistance
(RG) is an hybrid metric which have been sometimes related to the power grid vulnerability [8].
The effective resistance Ri,j between a pair of nodes i and j is the potential difference between
these nodes when a unit current is injected at node i and withdrawn at node j.RG can be obtained
as follows:
RG =
N−1∑
i=1
1
µi
(9)
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were µi are the eigenvalues of the L obtained from the weighted adjacency matrix of suscep-
tances. Others vulnerability indicators commonly used in the power network topological anal-
ysis are global efficiency (EG) and betweenness. The efficiency of a network is defined as the
average of inverses of the distance for all nodes. For calculation of EG the reader is reminded
to [22]. Betweenness has been recently used in [14] to identify most vulnerable lines in power
systems. The extended betweenness (Te(l)) has been introduced in [5] as fast metric to spot
most critical lines in terms of system vulnerability. The metric Te(l) is based on both complex
network and electrical concepts. For the line l is defined as:
Te(l) = max(|
∑
g∈G
∑
d∈Ld
Cdgf
gd
l |) l ∈ L (10)
where Gn and Ld are set of generation nodes and load nodes, Cdg is the power transmission
capacity from generator g to load d and f gdl is the linearised power flow sensitivity in the line l
with respect to an injection in generation node g and withdraw in the demand node d. Cdg and
df gdl are computed as described in [5].
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One-line Diagram of IEEE 118-bus Test System
IIT Power Group, 2003
System Description:
118 buses
186 branches
91 load sides
54 thermal units
Figure 1: The IEEE 118 bus test system [21].
The selected case study is a modified version of the IEEE 118 nodes test system. The network
counts 118 nodes, 186 lines and 54 generators which makes it fairly complex and suitable for
the analysis. Within the gird there are 55 PV nodes (i.e. generators nodes g) and 64 PQ nodes
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(i.e. load nodes d). The network model and load demand and lines emergency ratings data are
available in [20]-[21]. Figure 1 displays the network structure and generators location. The
original network data have been modified in order to simulate a condition of higher stress for
the network. Increment in the load demand of 30 % and Pemerg,l for all the lines l in the links
set L reduced of 20%.
Results power-flow-based metrics
The AC and its linearised version are used to simulate the network in normal and contingency
states the cascading indices CEI computed and line outages ranked. The analysis is performed
as follows:
• First, AC or DC approach is used to compute the optimal power production subject to line
flow limits, generation constraints and load demanded.
• The contingency analysis is performed by removing one line at a time from the system.
The AC or DC methods simulate the power flows redistribution in the branches given the
optimal power scheduled.
• Finally, the CEI(l) are computed for each contingency based on the equation 6. Line
vulnerability are ranked and ordered based on the CEI values.
Figure 2: Normalized CEI results comparison between AC solution and and its DC approximation. On the X-axis
the failed line (Line ID).
Figures 2 shows the optimal power production computed by means of the AC and DC method,
respectively. The Y-axis shows the normalizedCEI results and the X-axis the line identification
number (ID). It can be noticed that DC power flow, when compared to AC power flow, over-
estimate the cascading indices for some of the contingency listed (e.g. lines ID 141-150) and
underestimate them for others e.g line ID 13, 43, 153 (l8−5, l26−30, l89−92). This is mainly due
to the approximate percentage of rating PRk obtained in the DC approach. Nevertheless, the
results are in relatively good agreement, therefore it might be argued that DC solutions approxi-
mate AC solutions fairly well in both undamaged and damaged network conditions. Results are
summarized in Table 5 which displays the 10 most vulnerable lines in the system, with respect
to all the metrics analysed. In both AC and DC flow-based approaches the ranking results are
fairly similar and similar to previous studies, see as example [19]. The most threatening lines
result to be l9−10, l8−9, l8−5, l26−30 for both cases.
6128
Roberto Rocchetta,Edoardo Patelli
Uncertainty Quantification for the AC and DC Solutions
The AC and DC cascading indexes have been obtained by propagation of the uncertainty in
the load and in the emergency ratings. In accordance with previous studies, but with different
aims, the load demand PL,i ∀i ∈ N has been modelled as normal random variable distributed
around mean µi and with σi equal to 10 % of µi. Uniform distributions are assumed to model
lack of precision in the line maximum allowed flows. The upper and lower bounds have been set
equal to 0.98 % and 1.02 % of the design values. A single loop Monte Carlo has been employed
to sample input uncertainty and quantify its extent in the output. The number of MC samples
for each uncertain variable have been set equal to 2x103, each run counts 64 samples of load
demand PL,d and 185 samples of emergency rating Pemerg,l one for each demand node and
each line ∈ G in the network. Samples have been forwarded to the AC and DC system solver
and CEI(l) values obtained as described in the previous subsection. The contingencies have
been ranked based on the expected value of the cascading metric and the 10 most vulnerable
links have been selected. The ranking scores accounting uncertainty results slightly different
compared to the deterministic case. Nevertheless, metrics drops are affected by uncertainty and
some of the lines failures are more affected than others. The CEI variabilities boxes for the 10
most vulnerable lines are shown in figure 3. It can be noticed that for the DC approximation
CEI for lines l9−10 and l8−9 (rank 1 and 2) bear less uncertainty if compared to the AC case. In
Table 1 are displayed coefficients of variation (Cov) for the 5 most dangerous lines. Coefficient
of variation is computed as ratio between standard deviation and expected value and it is a
standardized measure of dispersion for theCEI distribution. The higher values confirm that AC
solutions are more sensitive to the input uncertainty, which is probably due to the assumption
made in order to apply the DC solver.
Figure 3: Variability in the normalized cascading index CEI for the 10 most vulnerable lines. Comparision
between AC and DC power flow solutions.
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rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CovAC 4.5% 4.5% 2.2% 0.0% 8.0% 8.5% 11.8% 20.7% 23.6% 81.2%
CovDC 3.2% 3.2% 2.5% 0.0% 0.5% 5.4% 1.3% 1.% 0.9% 20.2%
Table 1: Variability box-plot for the ten most vulnerable lines in the IEEE 118 bus system. Coefficients of variations
comparison when AC and DC power flows models are used.
Topology-based metrics and hybrid metrics results
Topology-based and extended hybrid metrics have been computed in both damaged and un-
damaged states. The analysis is carried as follows:
• First, adjacency matrix A and weighted adjacency matrix W are obtained for the undam-
aged network.
• The considered metricsMA andMW are computed for adjacency matrix A and W re-
spectively, as described in section 4.
• The contingency analysis is performed by removing lines from the network. The matrix
A and W corresponding to the graph of the damaged network are obtained and M(l)
computed.
• Finally, vulnerabilities V(l) are computed as in equation 5 for each line failure. Topology-
based and hybrid approach used A and W matrix respectively. The line failure are ranked
based on normalized increment in the system vulnerability.
The topology-based metric which have been obtained in the approach are the graph global
efficiency EG , ΛG(A) and ρG(A). These are computed using the unweighted adjacency matrix
A in a purely topological way. Similarly, the extended hybrid metrics have been computed using
the weighted adjacency matrix W built using susceptance matrix. These approaches account
for both topology and electrical concepts. In this work RG , ΛG(W ) and ρG(W ) are the hybrid
metrics being analysed. Furthermore, normalized Te(l) have been computed fore each line as in
equation 10, used as an additional metric for branch ranking. Table 5 shows metric values for
the undamaged IEEE 118 power network.
EG(A) ρG(W ) ρG(A) ΛG(W ) ΛG(A) RG(W )
0.216 259.56 4.112 0.3 0.0274 1565.6
Table 2: Topology-based and hybrid metrics results for the undamaged original network.
Table 5 shows the 10 most relevant links with respect to Te(l) and the variation in the vulner-
ability. Although different vulnerability metrics produce different scores, the most vulnerable
lines are successfully spotted. For instance, critical lines are l38−65, l23−24, l65−68, l30−38 all
ranked among the top 10 in 6 of the considered metrics. Similarly, lines l81−80 and l68−81 have
been identified as critical by 5 metrics. This result suggest that for the components ranking
purposes few differences can be found between hybrid and topology-based metrics.
Relative metrics drops and increments are displayed in figure 4, the results have been nor-
malized for graphical reasons. It can be noticed that some of the lines failure cause a drop below
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Figure 4: Comparison of relative drops and increment in vulnerability metrics, Y-axis, due to single line failures(X-
axis).
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Rank VEG(A) VρG(W ) VρG(A) VΛG(W ) VΛG(A) VRG(W ) Te(l) CEIAC CEIDC
1 l38−65 l68−116 l69−77 l65−68 l23−24 l65−68 l65−68 l9−10 l8−9
2 l8−9 l65−68 l49−69 l38−65 l68−81 l38−65 l38−65 l8−9 l9−10
3 l85−86 l68−81 l69−75 l68−81 l81−80 l68−81 l68−81 l8−5 l8−5
4 l30−38 l68−69 l75−77 l81−80 l38−65 l81−80 l81−80 l26−30 l26−30
5 l23−24 l64−65 l47−69 l30−38 l77−82 l23−24 l30−38 l89−90 l91−92
6 l49−69 l65−66 l77−80 l23−24 l65−68 l30−38 l23−24 l89−92 l89−90
7 l65−68 l81−80 l69−70 l82−83 l69−77 l70−71 l64−65 l89−91 l88−89
8 l82−83 l38−65 l47−49 l77−82 l82−83 l82−83 l77−82 l91−92 l82−83
9 l69−77 l63−64 l49−54 l70−71 l24−70 l100−103 l65−66 l88−89 l89−91
10 l68−116 l69−77 l70−75 l80−98 l30−38 l105−108 l8−30 l85−89 l89−92
Rank VEG(A) VρG(W ) VρG(A) VΛG(W ) VΛG(A) VRG(W ) Te(l) CEIAC CEIDC
1 0.031 0.4956 0.020 0.382 0.241 0.194 0.342 0.5931 0.57365
2 0.025 0.0299 0.017 0.352 0.178 0.159 0.267 0.5931 0.57246
3 0.023 0.0183 0.016 0.272 0.170 0.115 0.266 0.3028 0.39562
4 0.023 0.0062 0.014 0.266 0.147 0.111 0.263 0.2549 0.35366
5 0.021 0.0005 0.013 0.214 0.145 0.106 0.235 0.2297 0.17620
6 0.020 0.0004 0.013 0.203 0.134 0.103 0.165 0.2066 0.15594
7 0.018 0.0002 0.013 0.109 0.130 0.096 0.145 0.1099 0.07426
8 0.017 0.0000 0.013 0.102 0.113 0.074 0.138 0.1056 0.02133
9 0.017 0.0000 0.012 0.087 0.088 0.059 0.126 0.0973 0.01678
10 0.017 0.0000 0.010 0.072 0.074 0.053 0.119 0.0691 0.00246
Table 3: Ten most vulnerable lines for the IEEE 118 system. Ranking comparison with respect to different metrics
and normalized drops in the vulnerability.
zero some of the normalized vulnerability index (e.g. algebraic connectivity). A drop below
zero means an increment in the robustness of the grid which is caused by the lines removal (e.g.
line ID 146). The capability of the metrics to spot components which have unexpected negative
effects for the network robustness can have an interesting features of hybrid and topology based
metrics, exploitable to improve network robustness and future topology design.
Uncertainty Quantification for Topology-based and hybrid vulnerability metrics
Single loop Monte Carlo sampling procedure has been adopted as in the previous analysis
and uncertain input variable propagated and effects quantified in the output. The Monte Carlo
simulation approach and input distributions used are the same as for the AC and DC power flow
uncertainty quantification. The results obtained for the IEEE 118 power system shows that the
rankings are the same as in the deterministic case. For sake of synthesis, only results for one of
the metrics are displayed, the extended betweenness. Coefficient of variation for the Te(l) have
been displayed in Table 4.
The results shows that considered sources of uncertainty affect less these approaches, i.e. the
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cov Te(l) 0.5 % 0.3% 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3%
Table 4: Comparison of coefficients of variations for the ten most vulnerable lines ranked using extended be-
tweenness Te(l).
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maximum value for the Cov 0.5 % for the ten most vulnerable lines. This is a rather expected
result if considered that the load demand variability do not influence any of the considered
topology-based and hybrid metrics.
6 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
A modified version of the IEEE 118 nodes power network has been analysed and lines sorted
with respect to their contribution to the grid vulnerability. The comparison between topology-
based and hybrid approaches shows similarities in the ranking results. Spectral analysis of the
network require higher computational cost for obtaining a full spectrum of eigenvalues and
eigenvector for each damaged condition (and relative W , A and L).
Contingency analysis has been used to obtain a power flow-based cascading metrics, the
CEI indices. Both AC and DC power flow solver have been adopted for the calculation and
comparison between line ranking showing minor differences between the approaches. This has
been regarded as a confirmation of well-founded DC hypothesis for the system in exam. The
comparison of the CEI indices with topology-based and hybrid metrics suggest significant dif-
ferences in the ranking. The differences can be explained by lack of considerations about nodal
power injections and withdraw of some of the approaches. The considered topology-based
metrics even if enhanced in hybrid metrics cannot capture in full the operational vulnerabili-
ties in the network. On the other hand, power-flow-based approaches included power injection
and demands magnitudes in the calculation and hence able to identify critical components ac-
counting changes in the operational state. Nevertheless, many of the lines ranked using CEI
index resulted in a null contribution to the system vulnerability (due to null post-failure over-
load severity). This might be seen as a limitation of the CEI metric which has not been able to
capture all the relevant aspect and information enclosed in the line failures.
Uncertainty propagated through the AC and DC methods have been quantified in the CEI(l)
indexes. Ranking results show good agreement with the deterministic solution and between the
different power flow solvers. The AC output seems to be more sensitive to the uncertainties
in the input, which can be due to the less restrictive assumptions compared to the DC method.
The largest majority of the hybrid approaches make use of the DC assumptions. Generally the
goodness of DC approximation should be tested and model adopted carefully[10]. Especially in
scenarios where grid stress is high, such as sudden component failures or attacks, the approxi-
mation might result poor and not represent adequately the reality. Comparisons between hybrid
metrics and pure topological metrics show a good agreement in the line ranking although some
of them, i.e. ranking based on drops in spectral radius, differs substantially. This might be due
to limitation of the latter metric or computational inaccuracies.
7 CONCLUSIONS
The future electric power grid is a complex network which have to deal with uncertainty
from different sources. The correct functioning of the system and components will strongly de-
pend on the operational context. Therefore providing easy to follow guidances and robustness
metrics is uttermost important point. The metrics have to be capable of capturing uncertainties
and variability in the network dynamic and as well intrinsic topological weaknesses in a reli-
able way. In this paper different vulnerability metrics have been compared in their ability to
spot system criticality and ranking important components.The effects of uncertainty have been
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analysed and relative drops or increments in the metrics discuses and compared to the same
approaches with no uncertainty accounted for. The IEEE 118 power grid has been used as case
study. The AC and DC power flow cascading metrics showed higher uncertainty in the outputs
if compared to topology based metrics. This is due to operational variability not fully accounted
in the latter approaches and to the different assumptions. In conclusion, the selection of metrics
for vulnerability assessment of power grids have o be selected carefully. The analyst should
account both influence of the underling model assumptions and system variability. Wrong con-
sideration of uncertainty can lead to imprecise considerations on the system vulnerability and
in the worst case to misleading results on its robustness and reliability.
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